Citrix ADC Archive – Deyda.net

Web Authentication Action in NetScaler

On one of my recent deployments, I needed to set up external access using NetScaler to an internally hosted web application (Grafana).

Grafana is a cross-platform open source application for graphical representation of data from various data sources such as InfluxDB, MySQL, PostgreeSQL, Prometheus and Graphite.

The challenge here was that the customer wanted to pre-install authentication on the NetScaler, but the users were only known to the web application itself.

The question that therefore came to me was:
How can I check the user of the web application if only the web application itself has access to the user data?

I had only used standards like LDAP, RADIUS, CERT, SAML etc. for user authentication on NetScaler, but these were not useful here because the target system should not be changed.

SAML Authentication between Citrix & Microsoft with Azure MFA

Extension of the existing article with further troubleshooting cases.

As a result of increasing projects, here is a little how-to with the summary of my previous articles. The main points are:

Azure AD Seamless Single Sign-On (PTA / PHS)
SAML Authentication (Azure AD as IdP & Citrix Gateway as SP)
Citrix Federated Authentication Service (FAS)
Microsoft Azure Multi-Factor-Authentication with Conditional Access

Requirements

Fully working Citrix Virtual Apps and Desktop Environment (StoreFront & DDC Minimum Version 7.9)
Citrix ADC with successful base configuration & activated Enterprise or Platinum license (Minimum Version 12.1 Build 50+ for native workspace app, for browser Minimum Version 11.1)
Configured Unified Gateway vServer
Internal and external DNS entries for Unified Gateway vServer (e.g. citrix.deyda.net)
Certificates for DNS entries (wildcard certificates are the easiest)
Existing Azure Tenant with Azure-AD base configuration (Domain, AAD Sync) & activated Azure AD Premium license
AD Connect version installed and configured (Minimum Version 1.1.644.0)
Firewall release for *.msappproxy.net on port 443
Domain administrator credentials for the domains that connected to Azure AD via AD Connect
Installed Authenticator App on Test User Mobile Phone

ADV190023 – Enable LDAPS in Windows DC and Citrix ADC

Important Info:
The scheduled update (ADV190023), regarding LDAP Signing and Channel Binding for new and existing domain controllers, scheduled for March 10, 2020, has been postponed to the second half of calendar year 2020. The March 2020 update will only provide additional auditing capabilities to identify and configure LDAP systems before they become inaccessible with the later update.

The later update results in no more connections to the domain controller, via unsigned / Clear Text LDAP on port 389. Then it is only possible to use either LDAPS via port 636 or Signed LDAP (StartTLS) on port 389.

Checklist for Citrix ADC CVE-2019-19781

Citrix has released a critical vulnerability warning (CVE-2019-19781) in all Citrix ADC & Gateway systems one week before Christmas. Several working exploits have been released since Jan. 10, 2020 and are available to everyone.

Important ! The fix from Citrix with the Responder Policy does not work on systems with version 12.1.51.16/51.19, 50.31 and older. If this version is in use, please update to the latest 12.1 version.

The exploits allow remote code to be executed anonymously, allowing unauthenticated attackers to take over the various machines with root privileges.

SAML Authentication with Azure AD as IdP and Citrix as SP

Since Citrix XenApp / XenDesktop 7.9 the Federated Authentication Service (FAS) is available. Via Citrix FAS it is possible to authenticate a user via SAML and thus connect Citrix as a service provider to existing identity providers, such as Azure-AD.

Sequence of SAML authentication

The user browse the FQDN (e.g. citrix.deyda.net) of the Citrix Gateway vServer (Service Provider) to start his VA / VD resources
The Citrix Gateway vServer directs the unauthenticated user directly to the Identity Provider (Azure-AD) to authenticate itself (saml: authnRequest)
The Identity Provider points to its SingleSignOnService URL (e.g. login.microsoftonline.com) and the user must authenticate
The user enters his AD credentials and these are checked by the Identity Provider against the user database
Upon successful verification in the user database, the IdP is informed
The IdP issues a token (SAML assertion) and sends it to the Citrix Gateway (saml: response)
Citrix Gateway checks the token (assertion signature) and extracts the UPN from the assertion token. This allows access via SSO to the VA / VD farm via FAS (The SP does not have access to the user’s credentials)